

France

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1. Although France will remain basically anti-Communist in its foreign policy orientation, it is not likely to support substantially increased sacrifices for rearmament or to increase substantially its present degree of cooperation in NATO defense policies, and its attitude will continue to be heavily affected by fear of Germany. We believe that France will eventually ratify some form of EDC treaty, but will continue its efforts to delay and restrict the revival of West German strength. We do not believe that the French attitude would be substantially affected by Soviet propaganda or diplomatic gestures purporting to favor or to offer a unified and neutral Germany.

2. Difficulties are likely to continue on such matters as the building of infrastructure bases in metropolitan France. With respect to North African air bases, there is no substantial likelihood that France would seek to revise existing basic agreements, though it may well obstruct particular projects. There is little chance that France would grant base rights in North Africa apart from Morocco.

3. The French increasingly look upon Indochina as a liability, but in the absence of a cessation of hostilities in Korea the government will probably be unable to see an honorable way to extricate itself from the conflict. French belief that the struggle is an essential part of the anti-Communist world conflict ^{and} is balanced against the losses and economic drain without a clear end in sight.

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